To bring the matter home, would the commander of the Cadets, when they went to the war, be now made the honored object of hilarious and respectful junketings by the Palmetto Guard and the Louisiana Tigers? We would not erect those bodies into models, nor do evil because our neighbor will not do well; but we would not certainly honor conspicuous rebels while the rebel spirit slaughtered our brethren; and we certainly should not expect the slaughter to stop until we showed that we respected ourselves and our power sufficiently to abstain from honoring those who might stop it. The country should have not time to consider the sentimental question, "Are you going to fight forever?" until it had stopped the crimes which General Terry describes as rife in Georgia.

There is the advantage in the councils of extreme men, as they are called—that they understand each other. Set a thief, if you choose, to catch a thief. Fight fire with fire. These are exhortations that grow out of the depths of experience. It may not be an agreeable truth, but it is still a truth, that such a man as Thaddeus Stevens understood better how to deal with rebels than any more moderate man; and for the reason that he was of a like resolution and temper with them, but patriotically and nobly directed. The policy of reconstruction which has been adopted was the result of a situation which Mr. Stevens, and men like him, instinctively divined. When he spoke of confiscation and military rule and territorial condition, there was a general shuddering even among his own party friends. He was vigorously denounced as blood-thirsty and vindictive by the opposition. But he always quietly answered in substance, why is the blood of enemies more precious than that of friends.?

He did not, indeed, advise bloodshed. But he was of opinion that the blood of rebels should be spilled rather than that of Union men of any color. He knew, also, that it was necessary, by a thorough and radical reorganization of society in the rebel States, to show the rebel spirit that the country fully comprehended its own victory, and would certainly secure it. He knew that the contempt of "the North" was ingrained and traditional in "the South," and that the shortest and surest way of peace was to show a perfect readiness upon the part of "the North" to use its superior strength to establish its policy.

His view of the situation was correct. It implied nothing vindictive, nothing unjust. Gradually events showed its wisdom. The conduct of the South when Andrew Johnson began the reaction—the New Orleans and Memphis massacres—the black codes—the Ku-Klux—and finally, the total subjection of the Democratic National Convention of 1868 to the rebel chiefs—all revealed the actual facts and spirit with which the country has to deal.

That condition virtually remains. Nobody, of course, expects that any system will instantly pacify a State so long demoralized by the barbarism of slavery, and then so riven with civil war as Georgia. But because every thing may not be done at once, it would be extremely foolish to endeavor to do nothing. The removal of the colored members of the Legislature was a deliberate defiance of the authority of the United States. Had it been instantly accepted as such by Congress, and the territorial condition been restored, there would be at this moment much more security for life and property in hat State than General Terry reports. So, likewise, when it was proposed that the Cadets in Boston should honor General Magruder, magistrates and juries in Georgia would have been stronger had the Cadets decisively declined.

The remedy is, first of all, moral, then physical. Let the South perceive that we regard the war as a very sober matter—as an enormous crime, the memory and lessons of which are not to be drowned in a slop of sentimentality. Then the leaders will act accordingly; and if not now, in the next generation. It is a very great mistake that we can not wait. Experience proves that we can. Then the immediate remedy is physical. It is a disgrace to the country that it suffers such a condition of things any where in its domain as that reported by General Terry. If it is proved that Georgia does not protect lives and property, let the United States protect them by any necessary number of soldiers, and for any length of time whatever.